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Home Methods Statements The
Liver Survey
Results
Hepatitis C from
JET
GUN INJECTIONS
Boot Camp, Paris Island 1968

The study ended early
because the protector cap needle-free injector (PCNFI)
failed to prevent contamination in the first batch tested (8.2% failure
rate).
Vaccine. 2008 Mar
4;26(10):1344-52. Epub 2008 Jan 18.
Links
Preventing contamination between injections with multiple-use
nozzle needle-free injectors: a safety trial.
PATH, 1455 NW Leary Way, Seattle, WA
98107, USA. kkelly@path.org
Multiple-use nozzle jet injectors (MUNJIs), a type of needle-free injector, use
a high-pressure stream to penetrate skin and deliver medicament. Concerns for
their potential to transmit blood borne pathogens led to development of a hybrid
MUNJI for use in mass immunizations. The HSI-500, referred to here as a
protector cap needle-free injector (PCNFI), utilizes a disposable cap as a
shield between the reusable injector nozzle and the skin to reduce the risk of
contamination. This study aimed to determine the presence of hepatitis B virus
(HBV) contamination in post-injection ("next person") samples immediately
following injection in HBV-carrier adults. Tolerability and pain were also
assessed. The study ended early because the PCNFI failed to prevent
contamination in the first batch tested (8.2% failure rate). The
injections were very well tolerated, with most followed by no bleeding (81.2%)
or mild bleeding (7.8%). 55.2% of participants experienced no pain while 42.3%
experienced mild pain following injection.
PMID: 18272265 [PubMed - indexed for
MEDLINE]
Hepatitis
C is a result of receiving immunizations in service by
means of a multi-use jet gun injector.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Hepatitis C was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131
(West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, 3.303 (2005).
ADD TO YOUR CLAIM!
Vaccine Weekly
August 03, 2001
by N.R. Saltmarsh, staff medical writer -
Jet Injectors
Capable of Transmitting Blood-Borne Pathogens
Jet injectors
may be ideal for mass immunization programs but not until design
refinements eliminate their capacity to transmit blood-borne infections,
say researchers working in England.
The injectors, which are needleless systems that penetrate skin with
high-pressure fluid, have potential advantages over needles and syringes,
but P.N. Hoffman and associates at the Laboratory of Hospital Infection,
London, sought to determine whether they might have a major disadvantage
as well.
They used a highly sensitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to
detect whether small amounts of blood and fluid remained in the jet
injector after injecting inert buffer into calves.
All four injectors tested - two with reusable heads and direct skin
contact, one with single-use injector heads, and one with an injector head
that discharged at a distance from the skin - contained at least 10 pl of
blood, enough to transmit hepatitis B infection, reported Hoffman and
coworkers ("A model to assess the infection potential of jet
injectors used in mass immunization," Vaccine, July
2001;19(28-29):4020-4027).
"The source of the contamination was consistent with contamination by
efflux of injected fluid and blood from the pressurized pocket in tissue
that is formed during injection," reported Hoffman and coauthors.
"This insight should inform the design of safe jet injectors."
For more information about this study contact P.N. Hoffman, Laboratory of
Hospital Infection, Central Public Health Laboratory, 61 Colindale Ave.,
London NW9 5HT, UK.
Key points reported in this study include: * Needleless jet injector
systems are potentially beneficial for mass immunization programs, but
they may transfer blood-borne viruses * Researchers used a highly
sensitive ELISA to evaluate whether small volumes of blood remained in the
jet injectors after injecting calves with a buffer solution * All four
injector models tested transmitted more than 10 pl of blood, the minimum
amount required for hepatitis B transmission, and the quality of the blood
was consistent with efflux from the pressurized pocket created by the jet
injector
This article was prepared by Vaccine Weekly editors from staff and other
reports.
Follow up
http://cphl.phls.org.uk/divisions/nsi/lhi/highlights.htm (if this link
no longer works, click here
transmission of hepatitis
c by jet gun injections exists)
The Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) is the national reference centre
for medical microbiology in the UK. CPHL provides specialist expertise and
advice to the Regional PHLS laboratories, NHS hospital laboratories,
consultants in communicable disease control, community and hospital
physicians, environmental health officers, government and industry.
Public Health
Highlights
Interventions LHI in their reflective practitioner role receive many
requests for advice on the prevention and control of infection and
outbreaks. These cover infection control in hospitals and other, wider
aspects of healthcare. One example of this was recently generated in the
Infection Control Unit and concerns the transmission of blood borne
infectious agents by jet injectors. These injectors use a high-pressure
focussed jet of fluid to provide a needleless mechanism for penetrating
skin. They have great potential in mass immunisation campaigns in areas of
limited resources and allow high immunisation delivery rates. They would
eliminate many logistical problems such as the shipping of single-use
syringes and needles, accidental contaminated needlestick injuries to
immunisation staff, and the burden of safe disposal of sharps clinical
waste.
At
the request of the World Health Organization, we developed a laboratory
model of jet injection safety that could test the capacity of jet
injectors to transmit blood between injection recipients. Hepatitis B is
thought transmissible in volumes of blood as low as 10 picolitres, so a
novel immunoassay (developed in conjunction with Kings College, University
of London) was used that could detect these extremely low levels. Results
from the use of this model indicated
jet injectors can regularly
transmit relevant volumes of blood.
Use of this model under field conditions in Brazil (in conjunction with
WHO and the Brazilian Ministry of Health) confirmed the laboratory model
as valid.
As a result of this work, WHO and other major users of jet injectors have
reconsidered their use. A more positive outcome of this work has been an
understanding of previously unsuspected contamination mechanisms, which is
enabling design of new generations of jet injector whose safety can be
assessed in our model.
View Study
Paris Island Air Force inspection
Jet injector nozzles were frequently contaminated with blood
click here
Vaccines in the Military
Department
of Defense- Wide review of Vaccine Policies and Procedures
Read excerpt- Page 60 in particular says, "Of note is that the AFEB
made a site visit to the MTF at Parris Island and directly observed high
volume recruit immunization using jet injectors. It was noted that jet
injector nozzles were frequently contaminated with blood, yet
sterilization practices were frequently inadequate or not followed."
View complete report at
http://www.ha.osd.mil/afeb/reports/vaccines.pdf
Military discontinues the use of jet
guns for mass immunization of military troops
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
needle-free injection policy chronology
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(1997-11-20) Ped-O-Jet® manufacturer
(Keystone Industries, Cherry Hill, NJ) notifies
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP)
(Defense Logistics Agency) of intent to withdraw as device supplier
over liability concern for bloodborne disease transmission from
multiple-use-nozzle design.
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(1997-12-05) DoD
Medical Materiel Quality Control Program (MMQCP)
issues
withdrawal of automatic jet hypodermic injection
units (MMQC-97-1169).
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(1997-12-07)
DSCP issues Medical Products Quality
Control System (MPQCS) device alert (DSCP 970147) as "cautionary
measure", while noting the absence of bloodborne disease transmission
case reports over 35 years of military use (followup
MMQC-98-1019 dated 1998-Jan-30).
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(1998-01-09) Armed Forces
Epidemiological Board (AFEB) concurs with withdrawal of Ped-O-Jet® for
"routine immunization", but availability for "public health
emergency". AFEB recommends use of "newer technology" devices with
disposable parts for skin contact.
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(1998-04-20)
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
updates via
BUMED notice 6230 its Immunization
Requirements And Recommendations document (3.6Mb .pdf)
prohibiting jet injector use until otherwise directed.
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(1998-04-28) AFEB recommends DoD
formulate new needle-free injector specifications and support device
research and development.
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(1998-07-09)
Letter from Dr. Sue Bailey, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, to United States Representative
Alan B. Mollohan (D-WV), explaining DoD policy on jet injectors in
response to the concerns of a constituent of the Congressman.
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(1998-1999) Manufacturer
discontinuation of large multi-dose vials
for yellow fever, meningococcal, and tetanus-diphtheria vaccines
because of military withdrawal of Ped-O-Jets® capable of using them (MMQC-99-1248
dated 1998-Nov-03 and
MMQC-99-1251 dated 1999-Aug-12).
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(1998-11-25)
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery authorizes
military use of new disposable-cartridge jet injector (Preventive
Medicine Directorate).
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Current DoD policies and information
available at the
Military Immunization Information Source
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/dev/jetinject.htm
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U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
FDA Enforcement Report
The FDA Enforcement Report is published weekly by the Food and Drug
Administration, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health and
Human Services. It contains information on actions taken in connection
with agency regulatory activities. Snap shot as of
9/18/08
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/ENF00058.html
Product: Vernitron Majestic Table Top Sterilizers, Models
8080,
V8000, or R816 a table top steam autoclave with an
8" x 8" x 16" chamber. Recall #Z-738/740-0.
Code:
All of the above model numbers manufactured prior to 1985. (note:
these autoclaves were used to sterilize the Ped-o-Jet Jetguns used by
the military. Sterilization could not be guaranteed.)
Manufacturer:
Vernitron Better Built Corporation (OOB), Carlstadt, New Jersey.
Recalled by:
Vernitron Medical Products, also known as Ped-O-Jet International,
Dayton, New Jersey, by letter
February 26, 1990. Firm-initiated field correction ongoing.
Distribution:
Nationwide, Canada, Korea.
Quantity:
Firm estimates fewer than 100 uncorrected units remain on market.
Reason:
The locking hub may detach from the unit at high pressure as a
projectile and may also cause a compromise of sterility of the
contents of the sterilizer.
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00025027.htmCDC-
MMWR Recommendations and Reports
January 28, 1994 / 43(RR01);1-38General
Recommendations on Immunization Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
The following CDC staff members prepared this report:* John C.
Watson, MD, MPH Charles W. LeBaron, MD Sonja S. Hutchins, MD, MPH
Stephen C. Hadler, MD Walter W. Williams, MD, MPH National Immunization
Program, CDC
Jet Injectors
Jet injectors that use the same nozzle tip to vaccinate more than one
person (multiple-use nozzle jet injectors) have been used worldwide
since 1952 to administer vaccines when many persons must be vaccinated
with the same vaccine within a short time period. These jet injectors
have been generally considered safe and effective for delivering vaccine
if used properly by trained personnel; the safety and efficacy of
vaccine administered by these jet injectors are considered comparable to
vaccine administered by needle and syringe.
The multiple-use nozzle jet injector most widely used in the United
States (Ped-o-Jet) has never been implicated in transmission of
bloodborne diseases. However, the report of an outbreak of hepatitis B
virus (HBV) transmission following use of one type of multiple-use
nozzle jet injector in a weight loss clinic and laboratory studies in
which blood contamination of jet injectors has been simulated have
caused concern that the use of multiple-use nozzle jet injectors may
pose a potential hazard of bloodborne-disease transmission to vaccine
recipients (10). This potential risk for disease transmission would
exist if the jet injector nozzle became contaminated with blood during
an injection and was not properly cleaned and disinfected before
subsequent injections. The potential risk of bloodborne-disease
transmission would be greater when vaccinating persons at increased risk
for bloodborne diseases such as HBV or human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) infection because of behavioral or other risk factors (11,12).
Multiple-use nozzle jet injectors can be used in certain situations
in which large numbers of persons must be rapidly vaccinated with the
same vaccine, the use of needles and syringes is not practical, and
state and/or local health authorities judge that the public health
benefit from the use of the jet injector outweighs the small potential
risk of bloodborne-disease transmission. This potential risk can be
minimized by training health-care workers before the vaccine campaign on
the proper use of jet injectors and by changing the injector tip or
removing the jet injector from use if there is evidence of contamination
with blood or other body fluid. In addition, mathematical and animal
models suggest that the potential risk for bloodborne-disease
transmission can be substantially reduced by swabbing the stationary
injector tip with alcohol or acetone after each injection. It is
advisable to consult sources experienced in the use of jet injectors
(e.g., state or local health departments) before beginning a vaccination
program in which these injectors will be used. Manufacturer's directions
for use and maintenance of the jet injector devices should be followed
closely.
Newer models of jet injectors that employ single-use disposable
nozzle tips should not pose a potential risk of bloodborne disease
transmission if used appropriately.
(((Thanks Roger))))
This reads as a
tacit admission, problems existed with the jet injectors. .
NOVEMBER 1998
http://www-nehc.med.navy.mil/prevmed/epi/BUMED25NOV98.txt
SUBJ/MEDICAL JET INJECTOR USE FOR IMMUNIZATIONS, UPDATE//
REF/A/DOC/BUMEDNOTE 6230/20APR98//
REF/B/MSG/NAVMEDLOGCOM FORT DETRICK MD/081300ZDEC97/NOTAL//
NARR/REF A IS BUMED IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS NOTICE. REF B IS NAVMEDLOGCOM DRUG RECALL
NUMBER 97-75, DOD-MMQC-97-1169
AUTOMATIC JET HYPODERMIC
INJECTION UNITS/WITHDRAWAL (DPSC 970147).//
POC/MCBRIDE/CDR,MC,USN/MED-24B/WASHINGTON DC/TEL:COM (202)762-3495
/TEL:DSN: 762-3495// RMKS/1. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE COMMANDANT OF
THE
MARINE CORPS (CMC). THE COMMANDANT HAS AUTHORIZED TRANSMISSION TO
MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES.
2. PURPOSE: UPDATE GUIDANCE IN REFS A AND B ON USING COMMERCIAL JET
INJECTORS FOR ADMINISTERING IMMUNIZATIONS.
3. BACKGROUND: SINCE ISSUING REFS A AND B, SEVERAL ACTIVITIES
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN USING A NEW TRANSCUTANEOUS, CO2 POWERED
IMMUNIZATION DEVICE MANUFACTURED BY BIOJECT, INC. THIS DEVICE, MARKETED AS "BIOJECTOR 2000 INJECTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM", IS THE
ONLY FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) LICENSED HYPODERMIC JET
INJECTOR. IT AVOIDS RISKS OF BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGEN TRANSMISSION AND NEEDLE-STICK INJURY ASSOCIATED WITH PREVIOUSLY USED JET INJECTOR
GUNS.
4. GUIDANCE:
A. BIOJECTOR 2000 INJECTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS AUTHORIZED FOR
USE IN NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACTIVITES FOR IMMUNIZATION
ADMINISTRATION TO SERVICE MEMBERS AND OTHER BENEFICIARIES. AT THIS
TIME, NO OTHER HYPODERMIC JET INJECTOR SYSTEM IS FDA APPROVED-THIS
IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO CONSIDERATION FOR BUMED AUTHORIZATION.
B. USE OF HYPODERMIC JET INJECTOR APPARATUS LISTED IN REF B
REMAINS UNAUTHORIZED.
C. WITH BIOJECTOR 2000, ESTIMATED COST PER INJECTION AND
MECHANICS OF PREPARATION FOR EACH INJECTION MAY LIMIT COST AND
PAGE 03 RUENMED3162 UNCLAS
EFFICIENCY BENEFITS. HOWEVER, THESE CONCERNS MAY BE OFFSET BY SAFETY ENHANCEMENT THROUGH AVOIDANCE OF BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGEN
EXPOSURE AND ELIMINATION OF POSSIBLE NEEDLE-STICK INJURY TO BOTH
PATIENTS AND THOSE ADMINISTERING IMMUNIZATIONS. ALSO, SHARPS
DISPOSAL IS NOT NECESSARY.
5. POINTS OF CONTACT: A. PROCUREMENT: NAVMEDLOGCOM, FORT DETRICK, MD-LT
WILLIAMS, TEL: (301)619-3086; DSN 343-3086 OR HM1 SPICER, TEL: (301)619-7118; DSN 343-7118. B. BUMED-24: CDR MCBRIDE, (AS ABOVE) EMAIL: WZMCBRIDE@US.MED.NAVY.MIL.//
RTAUZYUW RUENMED3162 3291800-UUUU--RUCOFAE. ZNR UUUUU RUCKMEA T CG II MEF RUWICBD T CG FIRST FSSG RUWICBE T CG I MEF
R 251800Z NOV 98 ZYB PSN 895734I36 FM BUMED WASHINGTON DC//24// TO AIG SEVEN SEVEN EIGHT THREE AIG SIX NINE FOUR SEVEN INFO AIG ONE THREE SEVEN SEVEN SIX BT UNCLAS //N06230// MSGID/GENADMIN/BUMED//
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